Nigeria’s Forest Guards and the Battle to Reclaim the Forests

For years, security personnel have entered some of Nigeria’s most dangerous forests in pursuit of terrorists, bandits and kidnappers who understand every footpath, river and hidden settlement. The armed groups know where vehicles cannot pass, where telephone signals disappear and which routes connect one community to another. In many operations, this knowledge gives them an advantage before the first security officer arrives.This is one reason Nigeria has struggled to reclaim its forests. The country does not lack brave soldiers, police officers or intelligence personnel, but courage and weapons are not always enough when an adversary knows the ground better. A forest can become a weapon in the hands of those who understand it and a trap for those who do not.The Presidential Forest Guards Initiative is an attempt to change that balance. Launched by President Bola Tinubu in May 2025, the programme has now trained more than 9,000 personnel across 10 states. The latest phase produced over 2,000 guards in Kaduna, Edo and Kogi, following the graduation and deployment of more than 7,000 personnel in Borno, Sokoto, Yobe, Adamawa, Niger, Kwara and Kebbi states.Turning Local Knowledge into Security IntelligenceThe most important feature of the initiative is not merely the number of people trained. The guards are indigenous to their respective local government areas, and many were recruited from communities badly affected by kidnapping and banditry. They already understand the forests, rivers, footpaths and remote settlements around them, and that knowledge could help conventional security agencies see what outsiders often miss.A guard raised near a forest may recognise a route that does not appear on an official map. He may know which path leads to a farming settlement, which river can be crossed during the rainy season and which movement is unusual in the community. This information can strengthen surveillance, early warning and intelligence-led operations without attempting to replace the agencies responsible for national security.The initiative therefore responds to a basic weakness in Nigeria’s security system: the distance between rural communities and the institutions expected to protect them. Residents often notice strange movements before an attack, but the information may not reach the right agency early enough or in a form that can be acted upon. As first responders and what National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu described as a “force multiplier,” forest guards could serve as a bridge between affected communities and the wider security architecture.A Structure That Must WorkThe programme is coordinated by the Office of the National Security Adviser and implemented under the operational leadership of the Department of State Services. The National Intelligence Agency, Defence Headquarters, Nigeria Police Force and National Park Service are also involved. Participating state governments are expected to support the guards’ deployment, operations and welfare.This structure gives the initiative a national framework, but coordination on paper must become cooperation in the field. Intelligence must move quickly from the forest guard who observes a threat to the agency capable of responding to it. Without that connection, the guards may identify dangers without having the capacity to stop them.The latest guards are expected to be deployed to identified security flashpoints, including forests, remote settlements and border communities with limited conventional security coverage. Their duties will include surveillance, early warning and support for intelligence-led operations. The objective should not be to scatter personnel across entire states, but to deploy them to places where armed groups exploit the absence of government most effectively.Nigeria has established security initiatives before that began with promise but later suffered from poor funding, weak supervision or rivalry among agencies. The responsibilities, authority and chain of command of the forest guards must therefore remain clear. Several security organisations cannot operate successfully in the same area if they do not understand their respective roles.Training and Vetting Must Continue After GraduationThe first group completed an intensive three-month training programme that combined environmental conservation with fieldcraft, patrol operations, navigation and intelligence gathering. The training recorded a 98.2 per cent completion rate, while 81 trainees were disqualified on disciplinary grounds. This suggests that standards were enforced during the initial training period.The government also says the recruits underwent screening, background checks and security vetting to confirm their identities, community records and suitability for security duties. This is important because the strength of the programme—recruiting people with deep local knowledge—could also become a vulnerability if the wrong people enter the system. Vetting must therefore continue after deployment rather than ending at the training camp.The guards will be operating in communities where armed groups may already have informants, financial connections and social networks. Attempts to compromise, threaten or infiltrate them should be expected. Regular assessments, strong internal monitoring and protected channels for reporting suspicious conduct will be necessary.Welfare Is Also a Security QuestionThe guards will work in difficult environments, often close to the same armed groups that have frightened their communities for years. The governors of Kaduna, Edo and Kogi have pledged support for their welfare, deployment and operations, but those commitments must survive beyond public ceremonies. If salaries are delayed, equipment is inadequate or injured personnel and their families are abandoned, morale will decline.Paying and protecting the guards properly is therefore not charity; it is part of the security strategy. Personnel expected to restrict the movement of armed groups through forest corridors cannot be left without reliable communication, logistical support and rapid reinforcement. Their knowledge becomes useful only when the wider security system is prepared to respond to the intelligence they provide.Poor welfare could also expose the programme to corruption and infiltration. A guard who is badly paid and abandoned in a dangerous environment may become vulnerable to pressure from the same criminal groups he was recruited to confront. Sustainable funding must therefore be treated as a central operational requirement, not an administrative matter to be considered later.Community Trust Will Determine SuccessThe guards were recruited from affected communities partly because they understand the people and the environment. That familiarity could help restore trust between rural residents and formal security institutions. It could also encourage communities to provide information because they are dealing with personnel who understand their language, culture and daily realities.That trust, however, must be protected. There should be clear channels through which residents can report misconduct, while allegations of abuse must be investigated without delay. A forest guard who mistreats residents does not merely harm one person; he weakens the flow of information upon which the entire initiative depends.Community participation must not end with recruitment. Traditional leaders, farmers, herders, hunters and local associations should be included in structured early-warning systems. They should not control security operations, but their knowledge can help guards understand changes in movement, abandoned settlements and other warning signs within their communities.Results, Not Graduation CeremoniesThe programme must ultimately be measured by outcomes rather than the number of graduation ceremonies held. The government should periodically publish information on deployment, verified intelligence supplied, criminal movements disrupted, communities made safer and complaints investigated. Nigerians need evidence that the guards are reducing the freedom with which armed groups move through forest corridors.The broader objective is to restore government presence in vulnerable areas, protect rural communities and prevent criminals from using forests as safe havens. These are clear objectives against which the programme can be evaluated. The public should eventually be able to determine whether the initiative is meeting them.Transparency will also help identify weaknesses before they become permanent. If some states record better results than others, government should examine what they are doing differently. A national initiative should be capable of learning from each deployment and improving as it expands.A Missing Link, Not a Complete SolutionForest guards cannot replace the military, police or intelligence agencies, and they should not be presented as the single answer to Nigeria’s insecurity. Banditry and terrorism are sustained by illegal weapons, financing networks, informants, weak rural governance and failures in the justice system. Securing the forests must therefore be connected to border control, financial intelligence, prosecution and the restoration of government services in vulnerable communities.Yet the initiative addresses a real and long-neglected problem. Armed groups have treated parts of Nigeria’s forests as places where they can hide, move abducted people and organise attacks beyond the immediate reach of the state. By recruiting people who understand those spaces and placing them within an organised security structure, the government is beginning to challenge that advantage.The success of the initiative will not be determined by the number of guards trained, but by what happens after they leave the training camps. If they are properly equipped, paid, supervised and connected to responsive security agencies, they could become the eyes and ears needed to reclaim difficult terrain. If these conditions are ignored, Nigeria may have thousands of new uniforms without a meaningful improvement in security.The forests have protected armed groups for too long because the state has often entered them with limited knowledge and weak local intelligence. The Forest Guards Initiative offers Nigeria an opportunity to transform the knowledge of affected communities into a national security advantage. It is not yet victory, but it may be an important step towards ensuring that those who terrorise Nigerians no longer understand the country’s forests better than the government responsible for protecting them.